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Summary findings
Demirgiiu-Kunt and Maksimovic focus on two issues.  have a comparative advantage in funding short-term
First, they examine whether firms in different countries  investment.
finance long-term and short-term investment similarly.  For each firm in their sample, they estimate a
Second, they investigate whether differences in financial  predicted rate at which it can grow if it does not rely on
systems and legal institutions across countries are  long-term external financing. They show that the
reflected in the ability of firms to grow faster than they  proportion  of firms that grow faster than the predicted
might have by relying on their internal resources or  rate in each country is associated with specific features of
short-term borrowing.  the legal system, financial markets, and institutions.
Across their sample, they find:  An active, though not necessarily large, stock market
* Positive correlations between investment in plant  and high scores on an index of respect for legal norms
and equipment  and retained earnings.  are associated with faster than predicted rates of firm
* Negative correlations between investment in plant  growth.
and equipment  and external  financing.  They present evidence that the law-and-order index
* Negative correlations between investment in short-  measures the ability of 'creditors and debrors to enter into
term assets and retained earnings.  long-term contracts. Government  subsidies to industry
* Positive correlations between investment in short-  do not increase the proportion  of firms growing faster
term assets and external financing.  than predicted.
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Both the theoretical  and the empirical  literature  in corporate  finance  demonstrate  a link between
firms' financing  and investment  decisions.  The link  is due to market imperfections  caused  by
conflicts of interest  and informational  asymmetries  between  the firm and investors.  These
imperfections  constrain  the ways a firm  can fund investment  projects.  The magnitude  of this effect
may  depend  on the financial  market and the institutions,  such as financial  intermediaries.  A key
question  is whether  differences  in financial  systems  across  countries  affect  the way firms finance
investments,  and if so, how?
In this paper  we focus on two questions.  Do firms in economies  with different financial  systems  and
legal systems  finance long-term  and short-term  investment  differently?  Can specific  differences  in
financial  systems  and legal institutions  explain  the differences  in the proportion  of firms that grow  at
rates requiring  long-term  external  financing?
Similar patterns  in firms' use of capital  from external  sources  to finance long-tern and short-term
investment  in very different  financial  systems  would suggest  that these  patterns cannot  be explained
by the institutional  features  specific  to any single  system.  Our results  indicate  that is the case. In our
sample  of both developed  and developing  countries,  firms use their internal  funds  to finance long-
term investments  in plant  and equipment.  The use of extemal financing,  including  long-term  and
short-term  debt, is correlated  negatively  with long-term  investment.  By contrast,  investment  in short-
term assets, such as inventories  and credit to customers,  is positively  correlated  with extemal
financing.  These  pattems suggest  that extemal suppliers  of capital  have  a comparative  advantage  in
financing  short-term  assets, perhaps  because  of lower contracting  and monitoring  costs. Thus, a
principal  role of extemal finance  in established  firms may  be in providing  financing  for their liquid
assets,  allowing  them to redeploy  intemal funds  to finance long-term  investment.
3The similarity  in the observed  patterns  of financing  in countries  with developed  and emerging
financial  markets  has an important  policy  implication  for the foreign  development  financing.  The
fact that established  firms in developed  economies  finance  their investments  internally  suggests  that
financial  markets  and banks  have a comparative  advantage  in funding  short-terrn  investments.  If so,
policies that encourage  banks and investors  to finance  investments  in developing  countries  for which
they do not have  a comparative  advantage  may have unexpected  costs.
The second  question  we investigate  is whether  specific  differences  in financial  systems  and legal
institutions  are associated  with firm  growth  at rates higher  than could  be realized  using internal
financing.  A comparison  of debt  maturities  of firms in developed  and developing  countries  suggests
that greatest difference  between  systems  is in the provision  of long-term  credit (Demirguil-Kunt  and
Maksimovic  (1996a)).  Accordingly,  we focus on the effect of financial  systems  and institutions  on
long-term  financing,  i.e. long-term  debt  or external  equity.  For each firm in our sample  we estimate  a
financial  planning  model  to obtain  the maximum  growth  rate it could  attain  without  access  to long-
term financing.  The effect of differences  in financial  systems  on investment  is then measured  by
comparing  these predicted  growth  rates  with growth  rates realized  by firms in countries  with
differing  levels of financial  market  development.  Our approach  enables  us to identify  specific
characteristics  of the financial  system  that are associated  with long-term  financing  of firm growth.
Thus, we provide  a test on the micro-level  of the hypothesis,  advanced  by King and Levine (1993)
and Levine and Zervos (1995),  that the development  of financial  markets  and intermediaries  is an
important  determinant  of economic  growth.
In our empirical  tests we focus on two types of financial  and legal system  characteristics  that may
affect the provision  of equity  and long-term  debt financing.  First, we examine  the association
between  the effectiveness  of the legal system  and the financing  of firm growth.  A firm  that wishes  to
obtain long-term  financing  must credibly  commit  to control  opportunistic  behavior  by insiders.  In
4particular, long-term creditors commonly attempt to constrain debtors' opportunistic behavior by
debt convenants. For convenants to be effective, there must exist effective legal institutions that deter
violations and can compel compensation for infractions. 1
Second, we examine the association between the development of stock markets and financial
intermediaries and firm growth. Markets and intermediaries are important both as direct sources of
capital and mechanisms for monitoring requires that investors have access to information about
firms' activities.
The existence of developed and active financial markets and a large intermediary sector should
increase the ability of firms to raise long-term capital. 2
Empirically, we find that there is a strong relationship between the development of the legal system,
financial markets and intermediaries and the proportion of firms growing at rates requiring long-term
external financing. In particular, an active, although not necessarily large, stock market, and high
scores on an index of respect for legal norms are associated with firm growth financed by long-term
external debt and equity.  High scores in the legal index are also associated with the availability of
long-term debt.
This paper is related to the literature on internal and external financing of investment that developed
from the work of Myers and Majluf (1984). Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that financial market
imperfections make it costly for finms with inadequate cash flow to obtain external financing. The
imperfections mean that when the firm does obtain external financing it does so according to a
pecking order: debt is preferred to equity as the market for loans is subject to less adverse selection
' For a more extensive  discussion  of the role of commitments  and the legal system  in investment  see
Williamson  (1994, 1988)  and Shleifer  (1994).  For a cross-country  empirical  analysis  of the effect  of
institutional  differences on debt maturity  see Demirguic-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1  996b).
2 For a theoretical  treatmnent  of the role of financial  markets  and intermediaries  see Allen (1993),  Diamond
(1996, 1993),  and Holmstrom  and Tirole  (1993).
5than the market for equity.  Myers and Majluf do not explore the possibility that different types of
investment may be associated with different pecking orders. Our empirical estimates of sources and
uses of financing may be viewed as tests of whether the Myers-Majluf pecking order is consistent
with the data for the financing of two different categories of investment across a sample of countries.
Our approach also has implications for the related literature on financial constraints and investment.
Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), observed correlations between long-term
investment and internal financing in a sample of firms have been interpreted as indicating that those
firms are financially constrained. This interpretation has been questioned by Kaplan and Zingales
(1995). By contrast, for our cross-county investigation of financial systems we estimate the excess
growth made possible by external financing for each firm in the sample. Thus, our approach offers an
alternative method for directly identifying those firms that are financially constrained.
This paper is also related to the literature on the role of the stock markets in the provision of
investment capital. Morck, Vishny and Shleifer (1989) relate stock prices to investment outlays by
firms and conclude that the stock market has a very limited role in directing investment. While their
work is pioneering, it is constrained by the fact that they have access only to US data. Thus, they
cannot gauge the role of the stock market across different levels of financial market development.
There exists a related literature comparing the financial policies of firms in different countries. Rajan
and Zingales (1995) compare financial structures in a sample of developed countries. Demirgiiu-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1996a,b) analyze how institutional and economic differences between
countries affect firms' debt-equity ratios and maturity choice. This paper explores the links between
financial markets and institutions and firms' ability to obtain debt and equity financing.3
3 {% In contemporaneous  work  Rajan  and Zingales  (1996)  investigate  the relationship  between  financial
dependence  and industry  growth.  While  some of the issues  they address  are a subset  of the topics we cover in
section  three,  their paper differs  in major  respects.  First,  Rajan  and Zingales  (1996)  do not use the indicators  of
stock market  liquidity,  the legal system  or government  subsidies  that  are the major focus  of that section.
6The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the composition of firms'
investment expenditures and the sources of financing in the countries in our sample. We investigate
whether there exist associations between sources of financing and categories of investment
expenditures. In section 3 we analyze how the development of markets and institutions affects firns'
ability to obtain external financing. Section 4 provides some sensitivity tests. Section 5 concludes.
2. SOURCES  OF FINANCING  AND COMPOSITION  OF INVESTMENT
In an economy with perfect financial markets any firm is able to finance any positive net present
value project. If the costs of investment exceed the firm's  internal resources, or if the firm prefers to
use its internal funds to pay dividends, it can raise the funds required for investment in the capital
market or borrow from banks.4 In such idealized markets, the source of capital used to finance
investment is irrelevant and financial constraints do not constrain firms' growth.
In actual financial markets there exist several imperfections that may impose costs on firms that
obtain investment funds externally. Many of these imperfections are rooted in conflicts of interest
between investors and the firms' insiders. The firms' insiders have an incentive to exploit outside
investors by investing in projects that benefit insiders and may lower the value of the outsiders'
investment.5 In order to protect their investment, outside investors and creditors have several options.
They may require that mechanisms be put in place to monitor the actions of the firm. They may also
attempt to constrain the firm contractually from engaging in opportunistic behavior. This monitoring
and legal enforcement is costly. If these measures are not completely effective, then investors will
take into account the cost of expected opportunistic behavior when transacting with the firm. As a
Second,  they use aggregate  industry  data, rather  than firm-specific  data. Third,  they assume  that financing
requirements  of industries  in other  countries  are similar  to those  of corresponding  US industries.  By contrast  we
estimate  the external  financing  need  of each individual  firm in our sample.  Fourth,  our approach  separates  long-
term and short-term  financing  needs.
4 This is the idealized  financial  market  studied  by Modigliani  and Miller  (1958).
5 These conflicts  were first studied  systematically  in finance  by Jensen and  Meckling  (1976) and Myers
(1977).)
7result, the firm's  cost of external capital will increase. Businesses where the costs of enforcement are
large and insiders' opportunities for diverting resources abundant, may not be able to obtain
investment capital at any price.6
These considerations of market failure suggest that there may be certain categories of investment
expenditures that are easier to fund externally. In particular, liquid assets whose value is readily
ascertainable and which can be readily repossessed may be easier to fund than specialized
equipment. If loans can be secured by such assets separately, or if these assets can be securitized,
then investment in these categories of assets can be financed externally at relatively low cost.
Since the costs of monitoring and enforcement depend on the sophistication of the financial markets
and the legal system in the economy, the availability of external capital to fund long-term investment
may vary systematically with the financial system in each country. Specifically, if financial market
imperfections impose significant costs on firms that attempt to fund certain classes of investment
externally and if the differences in financial systems are material, then we would expect to observe
systematic differences across countries in the way these classes of investments are funded.
Little empirical evidence exists about the relationship between the sources of capital and the funding
of categories of investment across countries. For our empirical analysis of this issue we differentiate
between investment in three types of assets that firms use in their operations. Current assets are
assets with a short maturity, such as cash holdings, inventories and short-term credit extended to the
firm's customers. Fixed assets consist of plant and equipment used to produce output. The third,
residual category consists of assets whose maturity is greater than a year but which are not fixed
assets. These assets include such items as trademarks and patents purchased by the firm. They may
also include investment holdings in other firms.
6 See the discussions  of credit rationing  by Stiglitz  and Weiss  (1981)  and of adverse  selection  by Myers  and
Majluf  (1984).
8We consider four sources of financing for investment. The firm may finance investment internally,
by retaining its earnings instead of paying them out as dividends. It may also obtain capital by
increasing its short-term liabilities, such as the amount it owes to its suppliers or to financial
intermediaries, or by increasing long-term liabilities, such as long-term debt. Finally, the firm may
issue equity, either directly to the public investors, indirectly through the conversion of convertible
debt, or privately, in exchange for assets.
For each firm in the sample we obtain data series for investment in three types of assets. Short-term
investment are measured by changes in the firm's current assets, ACA. Investment in fixed assets,  I
is measured as the sum of the change in the firms net fixed assets plus depreciation.  Finally, net
investment in residual assets ARA is measured by the change in the firm's total assets less changes in
the value of net fixed assets and current assets.  By definition, changes in the firm's assets are
matched by changes in the sum of the firms liabilities and the equity capital. More precisely, for each
firm the following identity derived from the annual statement of changes in financial position holds:
ACA+I+ARA=  ASTL+ALTL+ACAPITAL+OCF
where ASTL is the change in current liabilities, ALTL is the change in long-term liabilities,
ACAPITAL is the change in issued equity and OCF is the cash flow from operations. The operating
cash flow is defined as the sum of earnings after taxes, less dividends, plus depreciation. All
investment categories and all financing categories with the exception of ACAPTIAL is obtained from
each firm's individual financial statements. The data for ACAPTIAL is calculated directly from the
identity. Thus, ACAPTIAL includes all increases in the firm's equity resulting from public offerings,
private placements, conversions of convertible securities and exchanges for assets of other
businesses.
7 Thus,  we are implicitly  assuming  that residual  assets  do not depreciate  or that  they are depreciated  at a low
rate. This  is true, for example,  of long  term imvestments  in other  firms.
9We focus on the relationship between changes in investment ACA and I and changes is in the firm
financing (ASTL, ALTL, ACAPITAL and OCF). In general, every term of the above identity is
endogenous and varies from year to year. Thus, it is impossible in general to assign a source for a
particular investment expenditure by a firm.  Instead, we investigate whether changes in the
financing mix are correlated with investment in current assets or fixed assets in each country in our
sample.
In our empirical work we standardize the investment and liability categories by dividing each by the
firm's total investment ACA+I+AR in that year. Thus, our focus is on the proportion of total
investment that each of the investment and financing categories comprises. The proportional
investment variables are denoted by PERINV and PERCA for proportions of fixed and current
investment respectively. The proportional financing variables are denoted as PERLTD, PERSTD,
PERREQ and PERRE and denote the proportion of investment financed by long-term debt, short-
term debt, newly issued capital and cash flow from operations respectively.
An advantage of our approach is that we do not need to compare the levels of real investment in
different periods. Both the numerators and the denominators of our variables are in current nominal
dollars. Thus, we avoid potential measurement errors inherent in the difficult task of obtaining
appropriate inflation adjustments of price of investment and the firm's stock of assets goods over
time for thirty countries. 8
s There  is a possibility  that within  year changes  in the price  level may affect  the results.  Accordingly,  we
recalculated  the statistics  presented  in Table I below  after making  an adjustment  for within  year inflation.  The
results  were unaffected.  The consistency  of results  across  countries  with  different  rates of inflation  also suggests
that within  year price-level  changes  do not drive  our conclusions.  See  section  4 below for a discussion  of
inflation  adjustments.
102.1 Sample and data
Our sample contains  both developed  and developing  economies.  The developed  countries  in our
sample  are Austria, Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Hong  Kong,  Italy, Japan,
Netherlands,  New Zealand,  Norway,  Sweden,  Singapore,  Spain, Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,
United States.  The developing  countries  are Brazil,  India,  Jordan, Korea,  Malaysia,  Mexico,
Pakistan,  South Africa,  Thailand,  Turkey  and Zimbabwe.
In Table 1 we summarize  some important  facts  about  the level of economic  and institutional
development  in the sample  countries.  Details of sources  are given  in the data Appendix.  The per
capita incomes  in countries  in our sample  vary significantly.  The Gross  Domestic  Product per Capita
of ranged  from $27,492  in Switzerland  to $359 in Pakistan.
The countries  also vary in the effectiveness  of their legal systems  in defending  their property  rights.
As an indicator  of efficiency  of the state in enforcing  property  rights, we use a commercial  index  of
the level of law and order in each country.  The index,  prepared  by the International  Country  Risk
Guide, aggregates  reports by a panel  of more than a hundred  analysts  on a six point scale.  Low levels
of the index  denote less reliance  on the legal  system  to mediate  disputes.  This indicator  has been
used in previous  studies comparing  institutions  in different  countries,  for example,  Knack and Keefer
(1995).
We also present  two other  macro-economic  indicators.  The average  inflation  rate over the sample
period provides  both an indicator  of the governments  management  of the economy  and evidence  on
whether  the local currency  provides  a stable  measure  of value  to be used in long-term  contracting.
There are major variations  in the average rate of inflation  in the sample  countries.  The average
annual  rate of inflation  is highest  in Brazil, at 327.6%, and lowest  in Japan at 1.5%  per annum.
11The remaining macro-economic indicator in Table I measures the average annual growth rate of the
Gross Domestic Product over the sample period. If investment opportunities in an economy are
correlated, there should be a relationship between the rate of growth of individual firns  and the
growth rate of the economy. Thus, the aggregate growth rate may serve as a control variable in cross-
country comparisons of firm financing choices and their growth rates.
Our last indicator measures the governments intervention in the corporate sector. These affect
financial structure decisions because implicit or explicit guarantees by the government may distort
market incentives and permit firms to obtain long-term loans on favorable terms. Our measure of the
governments intervention is the level of government grants as a percentage of the Gross Domestic
Product. As Table  1 reveals, the level of government subsidies is significant is some countries, and
exceeds 10% of the GDP in the case of Brazil.
The firm-level data consists of financial statements of mostly established firms in each country
reported, for the developed economies, by Global Vantage and for the developing countries, by the
LFC  Developing Countries database. 9 These databases cover the largest publicly traded firms in each
9Financial  reporting  practices  differ in detail across  the countries  in our sample.  The principal  reporting
requirements,  are described  in Fitzgerald,  Stickler  and Watts  (1979).  A direct  comparison  of the key provisions
of the accounting  systems  shows  that they  broadly  conform  to US practice.  The most significant  concern  in
interpreting  the financial  statements  from the sample  of countries  pertains  to differences  arising  from different
levels  of inflation  and  the difference  in how inflation  is treated in financial  statements.  This  problem  is likely  to
be most severe  for Brazil,  Mexico  and Turkey,  which,  as Table I shows,  had the highest  rates of inflation
during  the sample  period.  In contrast  to the other  countries,  fixed  assets  are stated  at their historical  cost,  the
reported  financial  statements  of firms  in Mexico  and Brazil  were adjusted  during  part or the whole of the
sample  period.  Since 1984,  listed  firms in Mexico  have  been  required  to use current  replacement  costs for
valuing  inventories  and property,  plant and equipment. Other  nonmonetary  assets  and stockholders  equity  are
restated  using  specified  consumer  price indices.  Any gains  or losses  resulting  from inflation  adjustments  are
reported  in the income  statement.  The financial  accounts  of Brazilian  fimns  have  been adjusted  for inflation
throughout  the sample  period,  although  specific  requirements  were modified  in 1987  and again in 1989.
Permanent  assets  and shareholder  equity  are adjusted  using  specified  government  indices.  As in the case of
Mexico,  the adjustment  was reflected  in the income  statement.  However,  observers  noted that the increases  in
the specified  index did not fully  reflect  the realized  inflation.  Turkey,  which  had the third highest  average
inflation  rate, 24\%,  did not permit  inflation  adjusted  accounting  (Price Waterhouse  (1993a)).  The high  average
return on assets  reported  by Turkish  firms  may be caused  by this underreporting.  Thus  care must be exercised
in comparing  the results  for Brazil  and Turkey  with  those of other  countries  in the sample.  To check  the
robustness  of the cross-country  results,  in Section  4 we omit  the high inflation  countries.
12country. For the developed countries in our sample data is available for the period 1983-91. For the
developing countries the period of data availability varies, but is usually between 1980-88. Coverage
by county and line numbers of Global Vantage data used to construct firm-specific variables are
described in the Appendix.
2.1 Sources and uses of capital
Figure I depicts the mean proportions of total annual gross investment accounted for by each of the
three categories defined above for our sample of countries. Figure 1 reveals considerable variation in
the investment mix of across the sample. Interestingly, the four countries with the highest
proportions of fixed investment to total investment are developing countries. As revealed in Table 1,
three of them, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, are high inflation countries.
Figure 2 depicts the proportions of total gross investment financed by each of these four methods in
our sample during 1980-91. The countries in Figure 2 are ordered by the proportion of their
investment financed by long-term debt. Inspection of the figure reveals that developing countries are
heavily concentrated on the left. Thus, firms in these countries use less long-term debt to fund
investment. Developing countries, such as Jordan, Turkey and South Africa also tend to be
concentrated among countries in which firns  in our sample rely heavily on internal financing.
Developed countries, such as Australia, Hong Kong and Spain, predominate among countries in
which firms rely least on internal funding. No such clear patterns exist for other sources of
financing.1 0
10There  are also some  differences  in investment  and financing  patterns  by size.  We classify  the largest  quartile
of firms  by asset size in each  country  as "large" and the smallest  quartile  as "small."  A larger  proportion  of
large firms' investment  goes into fixed  assets,  while  a larger portion  of the small  firms's investment  is in
current  assets. Large  firms  rely more on cash  from operations  and long-term  debt, small  firms  rely more  on new
equity  and short-term  debt.
13To investigate  the relationship  between  investment  composition  and financing  composition,  we
regress  the percentage  of fixed investment  PERINV  on three of the financing  components,  PERLTD,
PERSTD  and PEREQ  for each country  separately.  We drop the fourth  source of funding,  the
proportion  of funds provided  by operations,  since  the sum of all the standardized  sources  of funds
equals  one. 11 To reduce  measurement  errors,  for each firm we calculate  the investment  and financing
fractions  annually,  and then we average  the fractions  over the sample  period.  Thus, for each firm  we
have one data-point.
The results of the regression  of the fraction of the firm's total investmnent  that is fixed assets on the
fraction of funding  provided  by long-term  debt,  short-term  debt and equity are presented  in the first
three columns  of Table 2A. We interpret  the coefficients  as measures  of association,  and do not
ascribe a causal relationship  between  the firm's financing  mix and its decision  to invest  in fixed
assets.
The coefficients  of PERSTD  are uniformly  negative  and in almost  all cases significant  at the 1%
level. The coefficients  of PERLTD  and PEREQ  are also predominantly  negative  and significant.
Thus, in all countries  in our sample  a firm that invests  predominantly  in fixed assets is likely to have
a financing  mix that is weighted  away from all types of external  financing  and towards  financing
from retained  earnings.
For each country  we also test the size  of the coefficients  pertaining  to each form of financing.  The
differences  between  the coefficients  and their significance  levels  are reported  in the last three
columns  of Table 2A. Inspection  of the table reveals  that absolute  value of the coefficient  of
PERSTD  exceeds  the absolute  value of the coefficients  of PERLTD  and PEREQ  for most countries.
"i  We  obtain  similar  qualitatve  results  when  simple  correlation  coefficients  between  PERINV  and  PERLTD,
PERSTD,  PEREQ  and PERRE  are compared.
14The absolute values of the coefficients of PERLTD and PEREQ cannot be ranked as clearly.1 2 The
inverse relationship between investment in fixed assets and external financing is strongest with
respect to short-term liabilities and less strong with respect to long-term debt and equity. This
ordering of coefficients is unaffected when the level of investment relative to total assets, is added to
the estimating equations as an additional regressor.
In Table 2B we report country regressions of PERCA on PERLTD, PERSTD and PEREQ. The
results are in sharp contrast with those reported in Table 2A. The coefficients of the three financing
variables are predominantly positive. This pattern implies a negative relationship between
investment in short-term assets and internal financing. Thus, investment in short-term assets, such as
inventories and accounts receivable, is associated with external financing.'3
Tlhe  values of the coefficients are compared in the final three columns of Table 2B. A statistical
comparison of the coefficients shows that the coefficient of PERSTD is the largest coefficient in the
majority of the sample countries, whereas the coefficients of PERLTD and PEREQ cannot be ranked
as clearly.14  In sum, an increase in the fraction of investment going to short-term assets is associated
with increases in the fraction of total investment being financed by increases in short-term liabilities
mix. The proportions being financed by equity and long-term debt also increase, but less so. It is also
associated with a decrease in the fraction of the funds for investment that are internally generated. As
in the case of fixed investment, this ranking of coefficients is unaffected when the level of
investment, relative to total assets, is added to the estimating equations as an additional regressor.
12 In nine countries  the absolute  value of the coefficient  of PERLTD  is greater  than the absolute  value of
PEREQ.  In six cases the opposite  is true.
13 Note that when securities  are sold,  the funds raised  temporarily  increase  the firm's current  assets. When  the
funds are disbursed  this effect disappears.  Thus,  a positive  correlation  between  current  assets  and external
financing  naturally  occurs  immediately  after the issue  and a negative  one shortly  thereafter.  Similarly,  retained
earnings  not otherwise  used increase  the finns current  assets. Such  transitory  shocks  are unlikely  to
systemmnatically  bias based  on annual  data averaged  over  the sample  period.
I In 11  cases the coefficient  of PERLTD  is higher  than the coefficient  of PEREQ.  In four cases  the opposite  is
true.
15The tables indicate  that the shares of long-term  debt and equity are positively  correlated  with the
share of short-term  investments  in total investment  and negatively  correlated  with the share of fixed
plant and equipment  in total investment.  The prevalence  of this pattern across our sample  of
countries  with very different financial  systems  suggests  that it is caused  by differences  in the
characteristics  of short-term  and fixed investments  that expose  external  investors  to greater  potential
losses  when they fund fixed investment.  Established  firms use capital  markets  and intermediaries  to
obtain liquidity  and finance  short-term  investment,  such as accounts  receivable  and inventories,  that
allows the firm to use its own resources  to finance  long-term  investment  or dividends.  The
correlation  between  internal  financing  and fixed  investment  in fixed  assets does not imply  that
differences  in access  to external  financing  does not affect firm's ability  to exploit growth
opportunities.  Firms need  to invest  in both types of assets  to grow.  External  financing  of short-term
assets permits the firm to redirect its resources  towards  funding  investment  or paying  out dividends.
Moreover,  some firms, for example  firms with particularly  good investment  opportunities,  may at the
margin finance long-term  investment  with external  funds.
Our results have implications  for the literature  on capital  structure  in corporate  finance.  Myers  and
Majluf  (1984)  argue that there is a pecking  order in the sources  of funds firms use for investment.  In
order to minimize  the costs of adverse  selection  in the market  for external  finance,  firms prefer  to
fund investment  internally,  and use external  financing  only when internal  funds are not available.
When  external  funds  are used,  debt is preferred  to equity  because  it is less subject  to adverse
selection.
The results in Table 2 suggest  two modifications  to the pecking  order proposed  by Myers  and Majluf
(1984).  Empirically,  the proportion  of internal  funds  used to finance  investment  increases  only as the
share of fixed investment  in the firm's total investment  increases.  Increases  in the share of current
assets in the total investment  are associated  with increases  in the share of external  sources  of funds
16used. Thus, the pecking order empirically describes investment in fixed investment better than
investrnent in short-term assets. Within the context of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model this might
occur because short-term assets are easier to monitor and value, thereby reducing informational
costs.15 Short-term assets can also be normally converted to cash within a year, facilitating
collection.
The Myers and Majluf (1984) model focuses on the distinction between external equity and debt
financing. They argue that because debt financing is less sensitive to asymmetries of information
between the firm and investors, it will be preferred to equity financing when such asymmetries are
significant. Our results indicate that there is an important empirical distinction between short-term
debt and both long-term debt and equity in financing long-term projects. This suggests that in many
cases the expected costs associated with refinancing of short-term debt may be more significant than
the additional adverse selection costs equity financing over debt financing.
The signs of the associations between sources and uses of funds for short-tern  and long-term
investment is similar in developed and developing countries.16  Thus, we do not find evidence that the
financing choices in financial markets are fundamentally different in the economies in our sample.
This does not imply that firms' access to financing is similar.  We next address the question whether
the development of financial markets and institutions affects the growth rates of firms.
3. EXTERNAL  FINANCING  AND GROWTH
In this section we investigate the effect of the development of stock markets and the provision of
long-term credit on firms ability to finance growth. We adapt a financial planning model to estimate
15 Convenants  in long-term  debt contracts  may contain  provisions  requiring  the firrn  to maintain  a specific  ratio
of short-term  assets  to liabilities.  In these  cases,  when  the firm fails  to maintain  sufficient  short-term  assets, the
maturity  of long-term  debt is shortened.
16 Inspection  of the Table  suggests  that the associations  between  sources  of financing  and uses of funds may be
somewhat  stronger  in developing  countries.
17for each firm in our sample the rate of growth at which it can be financed internally or by only
relying on short-term financing. We then examine how the level of development of financial markets
and institutions affects the proportion of firms whose growth exceeds this estimated rate.
The question at issue is whether the underdevelopment of financial markets and institutions prevents
firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities. Such an effect,
if it exists, will not constrain all firms equally. Firms that can finance themselves from retained
earnings will be minimally affected, whereas the growth of firms whose financing need exceeds their
internal resources may be severely constrained.'7 To gauge the effect of access to financial markets
on the firm's ability to exploit growth options, it is necessary to identify firms that have an external
financing need and examine whether their realized growth depends on the development of financial
markets.
A firm's external financing depends on magnitude of its internal cash flows relative to its investment
opportunities. Both the finn's  cash flows and its optimal investment level are endogenous and their
ratio may systematically differ across countries even for firms employing the same technology. Thus,
for example, a firm whose technology is capital intensive may need to finance large investment
expenditures in order to grow. However, if the firm has sufficient market power or faces high
demand, it may be able to generate sufficient cash flow internally to finance investment, whereas an
equivalent firm in a more competitive economy may require external financing to grow at the same
rate. Moreover, the level of competition faced by a capital intensive firms may itself depend on the
development of financial markets and institutions. In an economy in which financial markets are not
well developed new firms may not be able to enter capital intensive industries. As a result, already
17  In this paper we focus  on direct  effects  of access  to external  financing  on firms.  Financial  market
development  may spur economic  growth  and  thereby  also indirectly  affect  internally  financed  firms  (see  Levine
and Zervos  (1995)).
18established firms in capital intensive industries may earn supernormal profits and be able to finance
their growth internally. l8
To control for this endogeneity, we adapt a financial planning model to estimate for each firm in our
sample the maximum rate of growth that can be financed internally or with limited access to the  -
market for long-term capital. If demand for their products is sufficiently high, firms can grow faster
than this maximum constrained rate by obtaining external long-term finance. The proportion of firms
that do so depend both on access to financial markets and on the cost of external financing. We test
the hypothesis that the less developed the market and financial intermediaries, the higher the cost of
external financing, and the lower the proportion of firms that grow faster than this maximum
constrained rate.
Our estimate of the firm's constrained growth rate is based on the standard "percentage of sales"
approach to financial planning.19  This approach makes three simplifying assumptions about
relationship between the growth rate of the firm's sales and the need for investment funds. First, the
ratio of assets used in
production to sales is constant. Thus, the required total investment increases in proportion to the
firm's  growth in sales. Second, the firm's profit rate per unit of sales is constant. 20 Three, it is
assumed that the economic depreciation of existing assets equals that reported in the financial
statements. Given these assumptions, the external financing need at time t of a firm growing at gt per
cent a year is given by
EFNt=gt * Assetst -(1+ gt )* Earningst * bt  (1)
Is  Moreover,  the capital  intensity  of an industry  depends  on the cost of labor  and  may differ across  countries.
This  reasoning  suggests  industries  that depend  on external  financing  may differ across  countries  and cannot  be
identified  a priori.
19  The percentage  of sales approach  is explained  in most introductionary  corporate  finance  texts.  For an
especially  clear presentation,  see Ross, Westerfield  and Jordan  (1995).
20 This is a strong  assumption.  Below  we provide  sensitivity  tests  that  show that our  results  remain  unaffected  if
we assume that  the earnings  on marginal  sales  are lower  than on average  sales.
19where EFNt is the external financing need and bt is the proportion of the firm's earnings that are
retained for reinvestment at time t. Earnings are calculated after interest and taxes. The first term on
the right-hand side is the required investment for a firm growing at gt percent. The second term is the
internally available capital for investment, taking the firm's dividend payout as given. The maximum
growth rate which can be financed internally is obtained by equating the EFNt to zero and solving
this expression for gt. This rate, referred to as the "internal growth rate"  IGRt and is given by
IGRt =(ROAt* b)/(I - ROAt * bt),
where ROAt is the firm's return on assets, or the ratio of earnings after taxes and interest to assets.
The IGRt is convex and increasing in the firm's return on assets. Thus, more profitable firms can
finance higher growth rates internally.
The internal growth rate is an estimate of the maximum growth rate in sales that a firm can finance
while relying only on its internal resources and maintaining its dividend. Firms can grow at a faster
rate by obtaining short-term or long-term credit, issuing equity or, in general by cutting dividends.
Since our focus is on access to long term capital we define two other measures of maximum growth
under financing constraints. Our first measure, the maximum short-term financed growth rate,
MSFGt, is an estimate of the maximum rate of growth of a firm that reinvests all its earnings and
obtains enough short-term credit to maintain the ratio of its short-term borrowing to assets. The
definition of the MSFGt, thus assumes that the firm does not engage in long-term borrowing or sale
of equity to finance growth.
The use of the current realized ratio of short-term borrowing to assets to calculate MSFGt, ensures
that the estimate is feasible and does not assume levels of short term credit that are so costly that
they would never  be chosen by firms. By the same token, the estimate is likely to be  conservative,
because some firms may have additional short-term borrowing capacity. The estimate of MSFGt, is
20obtained by substituting be=1  and by using the value of assets that are not financed by new short-term
credit in place of total assets in equation (1). The assets not financed by short-term debt are termed
"long-term capital"  and obtained by multiplying total assets by one minus the ratio of short-term
liabilities to total assets. More specifically, the MSFGt is given by
MSFGt =(ROLTCt)/( I  - ROLTCJ),
where ROLTCt is given by the ratio of earnings, after tax and interest, to long-term capital. For
brevity we shall refer to a firm growing at rate that exceeds the MSFGt as growing at above its
"predicted"  rate.
Our final estimate of the firm's growth rate is give by the "maximum sustainable growth rate"
MSGR&.  The MSGRI is the maximum growth attainable if the firm does not pay dividends and
obtains just enough short-term and long-term debt financing to maintain the ratio of total debt to
assets constant. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that the firm does not issue equity or increase leverage
beyond the realized level.
The MSGR  is obtained from equation (1) by substituting bt =land  by using the book value of equity
in place of total assets. Setting EFNt to zero and solving for the growth rate yields
MSGRt =( ROEt)/(l- ROEt),
where ROEt is the ratio of net income to equity.21 A firm's sustainable growth rate depends on its
initial leverage.
The three formulas above provide progressively less constrained estimates of the maximum
attainable growth rate for each firm. The estimates are conservative in three ways. First, as discussed
above, each maximal growth rate assumes firm utilize the unconstrained sources of finance no more
21 For a discussion  of practical  application  see Ross,  Westerfield  and Jordan  (1995).
21intensively than it is currently doing. 22 Accordingly, interpretations of our results below take this into
account. Second, firms with spare capacity do not need to invest and may grow at a faster rate than
predicted by the financial planning model. We attempt to mitigate the potential problem posed by
spare capacity by using each firm's maximal constrained growth rates averaged over the whole
sample period in our tests below. Third, the financial planning model abstracts from technical
progress that reduces the requirements for investment capital. Thus, it may overstate the cost of
growth and underestimate the maximum growth rate attainable using unconstrained sources of
finance.
Our empirical tests rely on ratios of contemporaneous earnings and assets and annual growth rates of
sales. The annual ratios are averaged over the sample period. We do not compare levels of earnings
and stocks of assets over several years. Thus, the variables we use are unlikely to significantly
affected by price level changes. 23
Table 3 presents for each sample country the proportion of firms whose mean annual growth rate of
sales exceeds the means of the three maximal constrained growth rates discussed above. Column I
provides an estimate of the proportion of firms that grow faster than our estimate of the maximal
growth rate compatible with maintaining their dividend payout ratio and relying only on internal
financing. Column 2 shows the proportion of firms whose growth rates exceed the estimate of their
maximal growth rate that can be financed by relying only on internal and short-term finance, as
defined above. Column 3 shows the proportion of firms in each country whose realized growth rate
22 The assumption  in the calculation  of MSGR,  that  the firm maintains  its current  leverage  ensures  that MSGR,
is feasible.
23 In the two highest  inflation  countries,  Brazil  and Mexico,  firms financial  statements  are adjsuted  for changes
in the price level.  In other countries,  the stated  value  of the firms long-term  assets  may  be lower  than than their
replacement  cost.  In the regressions  below,  we include  an inflation  variable  to detect  possible  misspecific  ations
and present  estimates  in which  the dependent  variable  is corrected  for within  year inflation.  There  is no
indication  that price level changes  are producing  significant  misspecifications.
22exceeds the maximum rate compatible with the maintenance of their leverage ratio and reliance on
retained earnings for infusions of equity capital.
Inspection of column I shows that in most countries a majority of firms grow at rates that exceed
those that can be internally financed while maintaining their dividend payouts. Thus, the majority of
firms in most countries require some form of external financing. The exceptions are Brazil and South
Africa, where almost two thirds of the firmns  grow at rates at which they can self-finance. At the other
extreme are Thailand, Japan and Korea, where approximately two thirds of the firms require outside
financing. For most countries between 40-50% would be a conservative estimate of the proportion of
firms whose supply of investment capital does not directly depend on external finance and the
development of financial markets.24 Column 2 shows the majority of firms in most countries can
finance their realized growth using conventional amounts of short-term financing. The exceptions are
again are Japan, Korea, and Thailand and also Singapore.
By comparing across columns it is possible to obtain a rough indication of the relative importance of
long-term and short-term debt in providing capital for growth. Inspection of the table reveals that in
most countries short-terrn credit appears to be more important than long-term credit in relaxing
financing constraints on the growth of firms in the industry. In only five countries, Canada,
Germany, Finland, Korea and Norway, does long-term debt play a greater role than short-term debt
in providing resources for growth.
Developing countries in our sample fall into one of three rough categories.  In the two countries with
the highest inflation rates, Brazil and Mexico, neither long-term nor short-term credit is of
2A  Note that while a firm  may be able  to finance  its desired  growth  rate internally,  it may not be optimal  to do
so. Thus,  for example,  in some  tax regimes  a firm  may increase  value by issuing  debt to repurchase  stock in
order to take advantage  of interest  tax-shields.  In the absence  of well functioning  banks  or financial
intermediaries,  the firn may  not be able to fully utilize  available  tax shields.  However,  while  this may be a
private  cost for the firm, it is not necessarily  an economic  cost  for the country.
23importance in relaxing the constraints on firm growth.25  In some other developing countries such as
Jordan, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey and Zimbabwe, short-term credit is relatively more
important than long-term credit. Finally, there is a group including India, Korea, Pakistan and
Thailand where the relative contributions of long-term and short-term credit to growth are similar to
those in the developed economies.
The comparison of India with Italy is particularly instructive. More Indian than Italian firms are
growing at rates that exceed those that could be self-financed. As expected, most of the difference is
accounted for by greater use of short-term debt in India. However, the role of long-term debt and
equity is comparable between the two countries.
We next describe the characteristics of externally financed firms in each country. For each firm we
calculate the proportion of years in which its growth rate in the sample period exceeds its predicted
growth rate. For each country we regress this variable on firm characteristics. The results are
presented in Table 4. Since there is no formal model linking firm characteristics to the external
financing need, the regression coefficients should be interpreted as providing descriptive partial
correlations rather than estimates of a model.
Inspection of the table reveals that less profitable firms are more likely to grow at rates that require
the firm to obtain long-term credit or equity (In twenty of the cases the coefficients are negative and
significant at 10% level or better. Only in the case of Zimbabwe are more profitable firms more
likely to require external financing). In fourteen of the cases there is a significant positive association
between the level of investment and reliance on external long-term capital.
The associations between growth at rates that exceed the predicted rate and the other firm-specific
variables show more variation across countries. For example, in Canada, UK and US large firms tend
25 This  result is consistent  with  Demirgiig-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1996)  finding  on the financing  choices  of
Brazilian  and Mexican  firms.
24to grow at rates that could be financed without access to long-term credit or to the stock market. In
Mexico, large size is associated with rates of growth that require long-term credit or equity.26
In seven countries, including Canada, Germany, Japan, UK and US, high dividends are associated
with rates of growth below the predicted rate. In several countries there is no association, suggesting
that some firms may be maintaining dividends in preference to reducing their long-term borrowing
or equity financing.27
In five countries, again including Canada, Japan and US, there is a significant negative association
between ratio of fixed assets to total assets and rates of growth that exceed the predicted rate. This
association is consistent with the result in the previous section that external financing is correlated
with investment in short-term assets. It may also reflect the industry composition and demand
patterns in these countries. The final firm-specific variable, sales to total assets, is not related to the
probability that the firm is growing at a rate that exceeds the predicted rate.
We next examine how the proportion of firmns  in each county whose growth exceeds the predicted
rate depends on the development of financial markets and institution. We test the hypothesis that the
more developed the market, the greater the proportion of firms able to grow at rates in excess of the
predicted rate.
26  Interestingly,  the association  between  firm  size and growth  in excess  of MSGRt  is stronger  than this
association.  This is because  the calculation  of MSGR  takes  into account  the firms  existing  ratio of long-term
debt  to equity.  Thus, in countries  where  using  the probability  of growth  at rates above  MSGR  as the dependent
variable,  the coefficient  of the size variable,  TAGDP,  is statistically  significant  in twelve  cases our of thirty. Of
the ten developing  countries,  it is positive  and significant  in five and negative  and significant  in one. By
contrast.  of the twenty  developed  countries  it is negative  and significant  in five and positive  and significant  in
only  one. This  pattern  suggests  that in developing  countries  equity  financing  and high levels  of long-term  credit
finance  the growth  of large funns,  whereas  in developed  countries  they tend  to provide  growth  capital to small
firms.  Note that this does not imply  that large  firms in developed  countries  do not issue equity  or have high
leverage,  only that  these forms  of financing  is not as likely  to be strictly  necessary  to permit  growth.
27 This  association  are stronger  when  the dependent  variable  is MSGR.  The coefficient  of DIVTA  is negative
and significant  in 19  of the 29 cases.
25In our regressions the development of stock markets is measured by the ratio of market capitalization
to Gross Domestic Product (MCAP/GDP) and a measure of market activity, the stock market
turnover ratio in each economy (TOR).  Both variables have been found useful indicators of market
development by Demirguy-Kunt and Levine (1995). The size of the banking sector is measured by
the ratio of the assets of deposit banks to the Gross Domestic Product (BANK/GDP).
We use an indicator of the ease with which firms can enter into long-term contracts. The law and
order variable is a commercially available index of experts'  evaluations of the adherence to legal
norms within each country, shown in Table 1. High levels of the index denote greater reliance on the
legal system to mediate disputes. The index is a good predictor of use of long-term debt by large
firms in cross-country study of financial structures (Demirgiiu-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996a)).
Finally, a firm-specific descriptor, the mean ratio of long-term debt to total assets of the firms in
each country, provides a direct measure of the utilization of long-term debt.
Three variables describe the economic environment of each country. We control for economy-wide,
as opposed to firm-specific, growth opportunities by the growth rate of the real Gross Domestic
Product per capita. We use the rate of inflation below to adjust for price level changes and, in the
regressions, as a control variable to detect possible biases resulting from price level changes.28  The
ratio of government subsidies to Gross Domestic Product is an indicator of government intervention
in the economy. The government both provides direct funding to firms and acts as an implicit or
explicit guarantor of loans. Table 5 contains summary statistics for the descriptors for the economy
and firm specific characteristics used in the regressions reported below.
28 The rate of inflation  is highly  correlated  with the variance  of the inflation  rate. Thus,  the rate of inflation  may
also be a proxy  for the costs  of entering  into long-term  financing  contracts.
26Our statistical model follows the cross-sectional approach used in the growth literature. 29 In Table 6,
the proportion of firms in each country whose mean annual growth rate in the sample period
exceeded their mean annual predicted growth rate is regressed on the means of the market and
institutional indicators and firm characteristics in each country.30  Our first specification in column
(1) is an OLS regression that includes only market and institutional indicators and the macro-
economic control variables. In column (2) we augment the specification to include firm-specific
descriptors. In columns (3) to (5) we retain only the statistically significant firm descriptors and vary
the specification to explore the role of two explanatory variables of particular interest.
Our two macro-economic control variables are the mean rate of growth of the economy and the mean
rate of inflation. The higher the economy-wide growth rate, the greater the firm's desire to grow at a
rate that exceeds its predicted rate. We include the mean rate of inflation in each country to control
for the possibility that there may be a systematic bias in the estimate of MSFG caused by inflation.
As predicted, in all the specifications reported in the table the coefficient of economic growth is
positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of inflation is only significant, at the 10%
level, in specification (2), indicating that systematic biases due to differences in inflation across
countries are unlikely to be influencing the results.31
Two variables measure the development and effectiveness of stock markets.  One of these, the
turnover ratio is positive and highly significant in all specifications. The market capitalization ratio is
not significant in any specification. Thus, an active stock market facilitates the relaxation of
financing constraints. Market capitalization, by itself, does not affect the growth of firms. The
29 This statistical  specification  takes  into account  that  the questions  addressed  are cross-sectional  and that long-
term financing  is likely  to be responsive  to permanent  rather  than transitory  changes  in the institutions.  A panel
approach  would  give equal  weights  to time-series  and cross-sectional  effects.
3  We do not have government  subsidy  data for Hong  Kong, Jordan,  South  Africa,  and Zimbabwe.  In addition,
dividend  data are not available  for Mexico. However  excluding  these  variables  from the analysis  to expand  the
sample  size to full 30 countries  does  not significantly  alter  the rest of the results.
31 We also discuss  inflation  adjustment  and  present  estimates  using  a specific  adjustment  below.
27coefficient of the law and order variable is significant and positive in every specification in which it
is included and in which the mean ratio of long-term debt to total assets is excluded. We interpret
this to indicate that a high degree of adherence to legal norms facilitates long-term contracts between
creditors and firms. When the ratio of long-term debt to total assets is included by itself its
coefficient is positive and significant. With both variables included, the coefficient of the ratio of
long-term debt to total assets loses significance, but remains significant at the IO\% level. However,
the coefficient of the law and order index loses significance. This pattern indicates that there is a
positive and significant link between the quantity of long-term debt outstanding and the growth rate
of firms. The pattern also supports the interpretation of the law and order index as an indicator of the
ability to contract.  Demirgiiu-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996b), found that high values of this index
were associated with higher levels of long-term debt. The new result shows that the effect of legal
institutions on the ability to raise financing affects firms' abilities to invest and grow.
The final institutional variable is the ratio of government subsidies to the gross domestic product. We
find no evidence that subsidies promote growth of firms in general. There is a negative relationship
between the level of subsidies and the proportion of firms growing at rates in excess of those that can
be financed internally and by realized levels of short-term debt.  This evidence is consistent with
several hypotheses about the role of subsidies. They may divert resources from firms in general to a
smaller number of targeted firms. The level of subsidies may also be an indicator of more
generalized intervention that reduces transfers of capital.
In the last specification in Table 6 we explore the relationship between government subsidies and
long-term debt in more detail. Of particular interest is the effect of government subsidies that are
provided in the form of directed long-term credit. Although no data on directed long-term credit is
available, an estimate may be obtained if it is assumed that the proportion of long-term debt that
consists of directed credit is higher in countries where government subsidies are higher. To capture
28this effect, in specification (6) we drop the government subsidy variable and replace it by a variable
that interacts government subsidies and our long-term debt variable. The coefficient of the interacted
variable is negative and significant. This result indicates that although long term debt has a positive
effect on growth, to the extent this credit is directed or government subsidized, it results in a negative
effect.
Two of the firm-specific descriptors are also consistently statistically significant. Capital intensive
firms are more likely to grow at rates that require long-term external financing than firms that do not
invest significantly in fixed assets. Interestingly, high-profits are associated with growth rates that do
not exceed the predicted rate. When controlling for institutional and market development, we do not
find significant associations between long-term external financing and the mean level of investment,
average firm-size, the dividends paid out by firms and the ratio of sales to assets.
4.  ROBUSTNESS  TESTS
We have performed several checks on the robustness of the principal results reported in Section 3. In
the first test we check the consistency of the results when extreme observations are dropped and the
estimations are repeated. We have also recomputed the firms' predicted growth rates under
alternative assumptions about the profits from marginal sales and used these new predicted rates in
estimations. We have repeated the main analysis of Section 3 using an alternative definition of firm
growth. Finally, we have reestimated the reported regressions after making a within-year inflation
adjustment on the dependent variable.
4.1 Outlier Analysis
29The specifications in Table 6 were repeated, dropping outliers for specific variables. Since the
number of observations is small, this procedure was performed serially: the countries with extreme
values of a variable were omitted from the estimations when that specific variable was analyzed, and
were included in the sample when subsequent variables were analyzed. In each case the aim was to
exclude obvious outliers. Hence, the number of countries dropped in each test depends on the
particular variable.
In the first outlier test we dropped the three countries with the highest rates of inflation: Brazil,
Mexico and Turkey. Subsequent tests involved dropping the country with the highest stock-market
turnover ratio (Germany), countries whose economies were not growing (Jordan and South Africa),
countries in which the fewest firms grew at a rate exceeding the predicted rate (South Africa and
Turkey) and the country with the greatest government subsidies as a proportion Gross Domestic
Product (Brazil). The results were not affected when these countries were dropped from the analysis.
4.2  Predicted Growth and the Profits on Marginal Income
The growth estimates used in the above regressions were based on the assumption that the firm's
profit rate on marginal sales equals its average profit rate. Thus, revenues from new growth are
assumed to provide as much resources for investment as sales to established customers. To test
whether this assumption is critical to our findings we generalize the estimates of maximal internally
financed growth to allow a lower rate of earnings on new growth. Specifically, we modify the
financial planning model by introducing a parameter z that measures the ratio of the profit rate on the
new sales to the firm's average profits rate. Thus, the modified predicted rate is now given by
MSFGt=(ROLTCt)/(1-z* ROLTCt).
As a sensitivity check we have reestimated specifications in Table 6 for  z=0,0.25,0.5 and 0.75. Our
conclusions remain unchanged. Table 7 presents a sample specification, specification (3) for the
30given  values of z. As inspection  of the table reveals,  the assumption  that marginal  earnings  equal
average  earnings  is not critical for our results.
4.3  Asset Growth and Inflation Adjustment
The financial planning model on which the tests are based assumes an equivalence between the rates
at which firms' assets and sales grow. Thus far, the definition of firm growth used in the empirical
tests has been is that of growth in sales. As a specification test, we have reestimated the regression
equations in Table 6 using, as the dependent variable, the proportion of the firms whose growth in
assets exceeds the predicted rate.  Our principal results remain unaffected. A sample regression is
shown in Table 8. Column (1) of Table 8 repeats specification (3) of Table 6, in which the dependent
variable is the proportion of firms whose realized growth rate in sales exceeds the predicted rate. The
realized growth rate of assets is used to form the dependent variable replacing realized growth rate of
sales in column (2) of Table 8. There are two differences between the results reported in columns (1)
and (2). One of the firm-specific variables, the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, loses significance.
The coefficient of the ratio of government subsidies to Gross Domestic Product, which is not
significant in column (1), becomes significant in column (2).  However, this is not a new result, in
that this variable is significant under alternative specifications in Table 6.
The variables used in the regressions are derived from accounting data, and except in the case of
Brazil and Mexico, are based on historical acquisition costs. In periods of inflation, historical costs
may not reflect with sufficient accuracy the value of the firm's assets. As a sensitivity test, we have
reestimated the regressions using an adjustment for the effect of inflation on firms' assets and
earnings. Since we use ratios and do not use time-series of levels data, we adjust for inflation that
occurs within any year so that the firm's total assets and earnings at the beginning and the end of a
31year can be compared . Thus, the value of the firm's total assets required to support sales at time t+1
in time t dollars is given by
((TAt+1/( 1  +7c))+(n  1(1  +  ))*(TAt-DEPt+i),
where i  is the rate of inflation between time t and t+1 and DEPt is the depreciation of the firm's
long-term assets between t and t+1.  The second term is an adjustment for the fact that the firm's
undepreciated assets continue on the firm's books at historical cost. Similarly, the firms earnings
between time t and t+1 are reduced by i  times DEPt+ 1 to account for the fact that the replacement
value of assets is higher than their historical cost.
When the regressions in Table 6 are reestimated using the inflation adjusted data and the growth of
sales as the relevant growth rate we obtain results for the stock-market and legal variables similar to
those reported in the table. The major difference is that now the ratio of the size of the banking sector
to Gross Domestic Product is positive and significant and that the firm profit variable switches signs.
A sample equation is shown in the column (3) of Table 8, where the equation reported in column (3)
of Table 6 is reestimated using inflation adjusted data.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigate two issues. First, we examine whether there are similarities across
countries in the ways firms finance long-term and short-term investment. Second, we investigate
whether specific differences in financial systems and legal institutions constrain firms to grow at
rates no greater than they could attain by relying on their internal resources or short-term borrowing.
For a sample of thirty developing and developed countries, we examine the sources of capital that
firms use when they invest in fixed assets, such as plants and equipment, and short-term assets, such
as inventories and credit offered to customers. Most firms in our sample used internal funds to
finance fixed investment and externally raised funds, especially short-term debt, but also long-term
32debt and equity, to finance short-term investment.  Thus, external financing may not primarily be
used to finance long-term investment directly, but to finance more liquid, short-term assets, thereby
freeing up capital that the firm can redeploy. This pattern of financing holds for almost every country
in our sample, both developed and developing.  The pattern suggests that conflicts of interest that
naturally arise between creditors and borrowers are more severe when external funds are used to
fund long-termn  assets.
To investigate the relationship between financial institutions and markets we estimate for each firm
our sample a predicted rate at which it can grow if it relies on retained earnings and short-term credit
only. We show that the proportion of firms that grow at rates exceeding this predicted rate in each
country is associated with specific feature of the legal system, financial markets and institutions.
Our results show that both stock market and the development of legal institutions are important in
facilitating firm growth. Firms in countries which have active stock markets and high ratings for
compliance with legal norms were able to obtain external funds and grow faster. High compliance
with legal norms is strongly associated with the use of long-term credit by firms. These findings are
robust and provide firm-level support for the proposition that the development of financial markets
and institutions facilitates economic growth., advanced by King and Levine (1993) and Levine and
Zervos (1995). Consistent with Levine and Zervos (1995), we find the size of the stock market by
itself is not as important in mobilizing finance as the level of activity of the market.
In our sample, we find no evidence that government subsidies to firms are associated with increases
in the number of firms growing at rates that exceed the predicted rate. Government subsidies do not
appear to have promoted economic environments in which firms obtain resources for financing
growth from financial markets. To the contrary, our evidence indicates that although long term credit
33is associated with greater numbers of firms growing at higher than predicted rates, in economies
where government subsidized this result is reversed.
The relationship between external financing and the composition of investment has two policy
implications for promoting investment and growth.  First, the fact that, even in countries with well
developed financial systems, external financing is more strongly associated with short-term assets
suggests that government programs that fund long-term investment directly are unlikely to be fully
successful if they rely on standard financial contracts and standard means of enforcement. Second, to
the extent that conflicts of interest between borrowers and creditors prevent effective contracting
between the parties, it is necessary to reconsider the implications of government policies that affect
earnings of firms on long-term investment. For example, subsidies that maintain an inefficient firm
in operation may reduce the earnings of its efficient competitors, making it difficult for them to
finance unrelated projects. Likewise, policies that permit increased competition from imports may
have an adverse effect on investment unless accompanied by development of financial markets.
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Figure  1. How do corporations  invest?  The figure presents the mean proportions  of total
annual gross investmnent  accounted for by current assets, fixed assets and residual investments in
the period  1980-1991.  Current assets are assets with maturity less than or equal to one year.
Fixed assets consist of plant and equipment.  The residual category consists of assets whose
maturity is greater than a year but are not fixed assets,  such as trademarks and patents purchased
by the firm or investment holding in other firms. The countries in the figure are ordered by the
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Figure 2. How do corporations finance investment? The figure presents the mean proportions
of total gross investment financed by short-termn  debt, long-termn  debt, newly issued capital and
cash  flow  from  operations  in the period  1980-1991.  Short-term debt  is defined  as current
liabilities, with  maturity  less than  or  equal to one year.  Long-term debt  are liabilities  with
maturity greater than one year.  Cash flow from operations is defined as the sum of earnings
after taxes, less dividends, plus depreciation. Newly issued capital includes all increases in the
firmn's equity resulting  from  public offerings,  private placements, conversions  of convertible
securities and exchanges for assets of other businesses.  The countries in the figure are ordered
by the proportion of their investment financed by long-term debt.
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Economic and Institutional Indicators
GDP/CAP is the real GDP per capita in US$ in 1991. Growth rate is the average annual growth rate in GDP/CAP for the period
1980-91. Average annual inflation is given for the period 1980-91. Law and order indicator is scored 0-6. It reflects the degree to
which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and  implement laws and adjudicate
disputes. Higher scores  indicate sound  political institutions and a  strong court system. Lower scores  indicate a tradition  of
depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims. Values reported are 1985-91 averages. Government subsidies are
defined as grants on current account by the public authorities to (i) private industries and public corporations and (ii) government
enterprises. The figures are as percent of GDP averaged over 1983-1991.
GDP/CAP  Growth  80-91  Inflation  80-91  Law  and Order  Govemment
(US $)  (percent)  (percent)  Indicator  subsidies  to private
1985-91  and public
enterprises  83-91
Switzerland  27,492  1.7  3.8  6  1.4
Japan  23,584  3.9  1.5  5  0.6
Norway  19,664  1.7  5.2  6  5.9
Sweden  19,649  1.6  7.4  6  4.8
United  States  18,972  1.9  4.2  6  0.6
Finland  18,046  1.6  6.6  6  3.0
France  17,365  1.8  5.7  5  2.4
Austria  17,288  2.2  3.6  6  1.3
Netherlands  16,479  2.3  1.8  6  2.6
Germany  16,439  1.8  2.8  5.5  2.0
Canada  16,098  2.0  4.3  6  1.9
Belgium  16,051  2.2  4.2  6  3.5
Italy  14,570  2.5  9.5  5  2.9
Australia  13,095  1.6  7.0  6  3.0
United  Kingdom  12,585  2.3  5.8  4.5  1.5
New Zealand  10,643  1.0  10.3  6  1.2
Singapore  10,294  4.9  1.9  5  1.9
Hong  Kong  9,820  5.8  7.5  5  n.a.
Spain  8,752  3.3  8.9  4  2.4
Korea  4,259  6.8  5.6  2  6.3
Malaysia  2,465  3.6  1.7  4  4.6
South  Africa  2,198  -1.0  14.4  2  n.a.
Brazil  2,073  2.1  327.6  4  10.7
Mexico  1,801  1.0  66.5  3  2.3
Turkey  1,375  3.1  44.7  2.5  2.2
Jordan  1,372  -2.1  1.6  2  n.a.
Thailand  1,362  7.0  3.7  3.5  1.4
Zimbabwe  630  1.7  12.5  2  n.a.
India  375  3.3  8.2  2  5.8
Pakistan  359  3.9  7.0  2  5.4
39Table II
How Do Firms Finance  Long Term  and Short  Term Investment?
The estimates (,  02,1 03  ) are obtained from cross-sectional regressions of firm level data using OLS. For each firm the variables are constructed annually and then averaged
over the sample period so that each firm has one observation. PERINV and PERCA are the proportion of firm's  investment in fixed and current assets, respectively.  PERLTD,
PERSTD and PEREQ are the proportions of  investment the firm finances by long-term debt,  short-term debt and newly issued capital. The last three columns report the
differences in the size of the coefficient estimates.
Panel A: Long Term Investment
PERINV[Fi,  = cc  + Di PERLTD, +02 PERSTDi  + 03 PEREQi  + a
Pi  r2  03  01-03  P2-P3  01-02
Australia  -.113*  -.243***  -.209***  .096  -.034  .130**
Austria  -.305  -.740***  -.586***  .281  *  -.154  .435**
Belgium  -.266**  -.368***  -.181**  -.085  -.187*  .102
Brazil  -.219  -.820 **  -.167***  -.052  -.653*+*  .601  *'
Canada  -.293***  -.451***  -.451***  .158**  .000  .158+*
Switzerland  -.675***  -.806***  -.648***  -.027  -.158  .131
Oemiany  -.564**  -.653***  -.366*  -.198***  -.287***  .089 e
Spain  -.307***  -.3460  -.291***  -.017  -.055  .039
Finland  -.503***  -.683**  .001  -.504*"  -.683'**  .179
France  -.569"'  -.554***  -.387**  -.182  -.168*"  -.014
U.K.  -.377***  -483***  -.418 "'  .041  -.065**  .107***
Hong  Kong  -.3430*  -.058  -.147  -.196'  .089  -.286'*
India  -.192"  -.478*"  -.169  -.023  -.309***  .286***
Italy  -.320"'  -.69900'  -.100  -.221  -.600*"  .379***
Jordan  -.970"'  -.916*"  .2S1  -1.251**e  -1.197***  -.054
Japan  -.551  "'  -.702"'  -.493***  -.058  -.2090**  .151  *"
Korea  -.577***  -.565'*'  -.556"*  -.021  -.008  -.013
Mexico  -.180'  -.685"'  -.135*  -.045  -.550***  .5050**
Malaysia  .078  -.254**  .060  .018  -.314**  .332***
Nethelands  -.145*0  -.904***  -.558'**  .413**  -.345***  .758***
Norway  -.620*0*  -.786***  -.003  -.616***  -.782***  .166
New  Zealand  -1.093$**  -1.093***  -1.778***  .684***  .685***  .000
Pakistan  -.436**  -.5460*  -.059  -.377*0*  -.4870**  .110
Singapore  .248***  -.110  .491***  -.243**  -.602***  .358***
Sweden  .077  -.333***  -.217*  .294  *  -.116  .410***
Thailand  -.295***  -.210**  -.013  -.282$*  -.197*  -.085
Turkey  .112  -.195  .247  -.135  -.442  .307
U.S.  -.262**  -.437***  -.299'*  .037*  -.138***  .175***
S. Africa  -.133  -.223***  -.173  .040  -.051  .091
*  and * indicate  statistical  significance  at 1, 5, and 10 percent  levels,  respectively.
AnPanel B: Short Term  Investment
PERCA 1FjRmqj  = a + t1 PERLTDi +I2  PERSTDj +  03 PEREQi  + e
DI  02  03  P0-P3  P2-03  01432
Australia  .124*  .446"'  .118*  .005  .328**  -322"*'
Austria  *344*  .732'*  .606***  -.263  .126  -.389"
Belgium  .672**  .802**  .097  .576***  .705**"  -.129
Brazil  .366**"  968**  .102**  264"  .867'**  -.603*'
Canada  .093  .416"'  .313***  -.220"'  103*  -.323*"*
Switzerland  .4720'  .845***  .672***  -.201  .172  -.373**
Germany  .518**  .625**  .210***  309***  415*'*  -.107'
Spain  .276***  .538*"  .532*'  -.256**  .007  -.262"'
Finland  329**  .731*'  .026  .303**  .706***  -.403***
France  .638***  .660*"  -.007  .645***  .667"*  -.022
U.K.  .364"'  .439"'  .102**  .262*"'  .337*"*  -.075'
Hong  Kong  -.037  .17  -.084  .047  .27200  -.224'
India  .125  .491***  -.020  .145  .511*"  -.366**'
Italy  .310**  .492***  -.002  .312*  .494"**  -.  182
Jordan  .841*'  .832***  -.394  1.235***  1.226**  .009
Japan  .551"'  .824**  .417*"  .133**  .407**  -.273***
Korea  .556**  .612"'  .509'*  .047  .103  -.055
Mexico  .180'  .685"'  .135*  .045  .550**  -.505***
Malaysia  -.071  .118  -.299"  .228  .417***  -.189
Needwrands  .082  .721*"  .207**  -.125  .514***  -.639***
Norway  .410**  .914*'  -.498  .908**  1.412***  -.504*
New  Zealand  .536**  .966***  1.720***  -1.184**  -.754  -.430*"
Pakistan  .436**  .546*"  .059  .377"*  .487**  -.110
Singapore  -.223**  .165"  -.583**  .360**  .748*"*  -.387*"*
Sweden  .111  .315**  .108  .003  .207  -.204
Thailand  .149**  .357"'  .062  .086  .295"*'  -.208**"
Turkey  -.102  .625*"'  -.291'*  .189  .916*"'  -.727***
U.S.  .105**  .419'*  .222**"  -.116"*  .198*"  -.314***
S. Africa  .107  .255"'  .156  -.048  .100  -.148
"'*,**  and * indicate  statistical  significance  at 1,  5, and 10  percent  levels,  respectively.
41Table III
Proportion  of Firms Growing  Faster  than Predicted
For each firm intemal growth rate (IGRj) is given by (ROAtxb)/(l-ROAtxb) where ROA, is the firm's return on assets
and b  is the proportion  of  the firm's  eamings  that are retained for reinvestment  at time t.  Maximum  short-term
financed growth rate (MSFGO)  is defined as ROLTCV(I-ROLTCt) where ROLTC, is the ratio of eamings, after tax and
interest, to long term capital.  Maximum sustainable growth rate (MSGR.) is given by ROEV/(I-ROEt)  where ROE, is
the return on equity.  For each firm, these growth rates are calculated annually.  For each country, the proportion of
firms whose mean annual growth rate of sales exceeds the means of the three constrained growth rates (IGR, MSFG,
MSGR) are presented below.
Proportion of firms that exceed their:
Internal growth rate  Maximum short-term financed  Maximum sustainable growth rate
growth rate
IGR~=(ROAxb)/(  l -ROAxb)  MSFG=ROLTC/( I  -ROLTC)  MSGR=ROE/( I-ROE)
Australia  0.58  0.41  0.34
Austria  0.54  0.43  0.32
Belgium  0.49  0.33  0.18
Brazil  0.38  0.37  0.37
Canada  0.57  0.47  0.36
Switzerland  0.53  0.39  0.29
Germany  0.60  0.48  0.30
Spain  0.58  0.41  0.32
Finland  0.55  0.44  0.23
France  0.59  0.38  0.22
U.K.  0.55  0.32  0.26
Hong Kong  0.52  0.35  0.31
India  0.58  0.38  0.25
Italy  0.44  0.31  0.20
Jordan  0.55  0.40  0.37
Japan  0.68  0.52  0.38
Korea  0.67  0.56  0.43
Mexico  0.47  0.44  0.42
Malaysia  0.63  0.48  0.42
Netherlands  0.58  0.34  0.22
Norway  0.54  0.48  0.23
New Zealand  0.50  0.40  0.30
Pakistan  0.50  0.28  0.19
Singapore  0.61  0.50  0.45
Sweden  0.45  0.30  0.15
Thailand  0.71  0.50  0.41
Turkey  0.50  0.23  0.18
U.S.  0.55  0.42  0.31
S. Africa  0.35  0.19  0.14
Zimbabwe  0.54  0.37  0.30
42Table IV
Firms  Growing Above Predicted  Rates and  Their  Characteristics
The estimated model is: Excess Growth[F 1,,i,  = a  + J3  NFATA 1 + [32 DIVTA; + J3 PROFIT 1 + (4 TAGDP; +J5 NSNFA;
+  06  NVITAI-,i +  07  LTD/TA,.l,i +  e 1 . The regressions  are estimated  using  OLS. The dependent  variable is  the
proportion of years in the sample period that a firm grows above its maximum short term financed growth rate, which
is defined as ROLTC/(l-ROLTC)  where ROLTC, is the ratio of earnings, after tax and interest, to long term capital.
Firm characteristics are averaged over the firms'  sample period, so that each firm has one observation.  NFATA is the
net fixed assets divided by total assets.  DIVTA is the dividends divided by total assets.  PROFIT is the income before
interest and taxes divided by total assets. TAGDP is the total assets of the firm divided by the GDP of  the country.
NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. INV/TAt, is total investment divided by total assets in the previous
period. LTDITA,  1 is long term debt divided by total assets in the previous period. The regressions include an intercept
whose coefficients are  not reported.
NFATA  DIVTA  PROFIT  TAGDP  NSNFA  INV/TAt,  LTD/TA  [,
Australia  .021  -.935  -1.349'*'  -2.248  .000  .264"*'  .160
Austria  .005  3.520  -2.059*"  6.180"  .001  .436  .109
Belgium  -.086  -2.941  -.659  -2.014  .001  .896*'  -.296
Brazil  -.021  4.874  -.029  6.146  .029  -.064  -.143
Canada  -.136*  -6.500"'*  -.764*"'  -7.537*'  -.009*'  .004  .093
Switzerland  -.330"  .540  -2.371"*'  -.223  -.006*  .551  "*  .916*"'
Germany  -.087  -2.138'  -.688"*  -3.920  -.001  .805"'  -.208
Spain  -.139  -.682  -2.192'**  4.133  .004  .004  .549
Finland  -.074  -3.812  -3.759*  4.307  -.011  .360  -.581
France  .060  -1.435  -1.087" '  -2.802  -.001  .216"'*  .309"*
U.K.  -.022  -2.200"'*  -1.062'*'  -20.077" '  .002'  .338"'*  .412***
Hong  Kong  .140  -.574  -1.085*  -1.613  .000  .392"  .365
India  -.046  1.138  -1.275*"  -13.657  .002  1.108"'*  .576*
Italy  .288  -5.940  -1.260  .819  .014  .520'  -.191
Jordan  .320  1.257  -1.353'  4.906*"  .000  .700"  1.225"
Japan  -.268"'  -3.465*  -2.275*"  -1.772  .000  1.821"'  .395"'
Korea  .114  -5.624  -2.437"  13.554  .004  1.376"**  -.089
Mexico  .246  n.a.  -.526  16.750"  -.067  .434'  -.487
Malaysia  -.096  -5.254"*  .605  1.457  -.004  -.062  -.123
Netherlands  -.041  2.412  -2.460"'*  -2.505  .000  .109  .791"*'
Norway  .166  1.575  -2.013*  -1.274  .057  .731  .492
New Zealand  -.188  -.484  -2.259*  -.178  .000  .185  .991
Pakistan  .210  -.926  -.372  11.131  .000  .637*"  .795"**
Singapore  -.083  .458  -1.583"'*  1.327'  -.004  .145  .157
Sweden  .234  -.304  -1.157  .691  -.006  .258  -.085
Thailand  .010  -.266  -1.725**'  -51.686"  .000  .576**'  .401
Turkey  .563"*'  -2.431 '*  '  -.263  -2.620  .011  .123  -.071
U.S.  -.173***  -3.001**'  -1.177**'  -53.009**'  .001'  .879*"'  .289"*'
S. Africa  -.434**  -1.993  -.139  1.045  .000  .102'  -.530
Zimbabwe  n.a.  -6.473*"  1.334"*  8.043*  n.a.  -.435'  -.035
and * indicate  statistical  significance  at 1,  5, and 10  percents,  respectively.
43Table V
Summary Statistics
The proportion of firms that are growing faster than predicted is the proportion of firms in a country whose mean growth in
sales exceed their mean maximum short term financed growth rates (MSFG). For each firm MSFG  is defined as ROLTC/(l -
ROLTC) where ROLTC is the ratio of earnings, after tax and interest, to long term capital. MCAP/GDP is the stock market
capitalization of the country divided by its GDP.  TOR is stock market turnover defined as the total value of  shares traded
divided by market capitalization.  INFLATION is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator.  BANK/GDP is the total assets of the
deposit money banks divided by GDP.  LAW & ORDER, scored I to 6,  is an indicator of the degree to which the citizens of a
country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  GROWTH is the growth rate of
the real GDP per capita. GOV. SUBS./GDP are the grants on current account by the public authorities to (i) private industries
and public  corporations  and (ii) government  enterprises, divided by  GDP. All  country-level variables  are annual  figures,
averaged over the 1980-1991 period.  NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets.  DIVTA is the dividends divided
by total assets.  PROFIT is the income before interest and taxes divided by total assets. TAGDP is the total assets of the firms
divided by the GDP of  the country.  NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. INV/TA is total investment divided by
total assets. LTD/TA is long term debt divided by total assets.  All firm-level variables are averaged over firms in each country
and over  the 1980-1991 period.  The following are the summary statistics for the 30 countries listed in Table 1.
N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum
Proportion of firms that are growing faster than predicted (MSFG)  30  0.396  0.086  0.192  0.564
MCAP/GDP  30  0.388  0.352  0.051  1.257
TOR  30  0.325  0.201  0.049  0.901
INFLATION  30  0.137  0.261  0.026  1.420
BANK/GDP  30  1.242  0.625  0.353  2.906
LAW & ORDER  30  4.452  1.591  1.714  6.000
GROWTH  30  0.021  0.020  -0.022  0.069
GOV. SUBS./GDP  26  3.164  2.298  0.600  10.933
NFATA  29  0.379  0.095  0.209  0.639
DIVTA  29  0.023  0.016  0.002  0.068
TAGDP  30  0.0003  0.0007  0.0000  0.0030
PROFIT  30  0.105  0.042  0.056  0.238
NSNFA  29  5.193  2.300  1.174  11.210
INVITA  30  0.187  0.167  0.081  0.892
LTD/TA  30  0.214  0.103  0.079  0.481
44Table VI
Proportion  of Firms  Growing Faster  Than  Predicted  - Cross Country  Results
The regression equation estimated is: Excess Growth 1co,,., 1 i  = a  + 0I MCAP/GDPj + 12 TOR, + 133  INFLATION; + j4
BANK/GDP; + 0,  LAW & ORDER, +  136 GROWTHi +  13  GOV. SUBS./GDP; + 13e  NFATA 1 + 19 PROFIT; +  P,0
DIVTA, +1,3 TAGDP; +  132  NSNFA, +  1,33  INV/TAj +  314 LTD/TAj +  0,,  (LTD/TAj x GOV.  SUBS./GDPj) + Ei.
Dependent variable is the proportion of firms that  grow faster than their predicted  growth rate. These are firrns in a
country whose mean growth in sales exceed their mean maximum short term financed growth rates (MSFG). For each
firm MSFG is defined as ROLTC/(I-ROLTC) where ROLTC is the ratio of earnings, after tax and interest, to long term
capital. MCAP/GDP is the stock market capitalization of the country divided by its GDP.  TOR is stock market turnover
defined as the total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization.  INFLATION is the inflation rate of the
GDP deflator.  BANK/GDP is the total assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP.  LAW & ORDER, scored I
to 6,  is an indicator of the degree to which the citizens of  a country are able to utilize the existing  legal system to
mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  GROWTH is the growth rate of the real GDP per capita. GOV. SUBS./GDP are
the  grants  on  current  account  by the  public  authorities to  (i)  private  industries and  public  corporations and  (ii)
government  enterprises,  divided by  GDP. NFATA  is the net  fixed  assets divided by total  assets.  DIVTA is the
dividends divided by total assets.  PROFIT is the income before interest and taxes divided by total assets. TAGDP is the
total assets of the firms divided by the GDP of  the country.  NSNFA  is the net sales divided by net fixed assets.
INV/TA is total investment divided by total assets. LTD/TA is long term debt divided by total assets. All variables are
averaged over the 1980-1991 period.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in parantheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
INTERCEPT  .127*e  .224  .114  .177  .223  *  *  .144
(.062)  (.202)  (.126)  (.125)  (.085)  (.085)
MCAP/GDP  .030  .011  -.034  -.016  -.011  .004
(.044)  (.038)  (.033)  (.032)  (.034)  (.033)
TOR  .241***  .1910*  .179***  .161***  .153***  .153***
(.045)  (.091)  (.032)  (.030)  (.027)  (.031)
INFLATION  .013  .136*  -.048  .009  .023  -.034
(.049)  (.008)  (.045)  (.063)  (.056)  (.037)
BANK/GDP  -.014  .008  .012  .010  .011  .014
(.017)  (.050)  (.014)  (.015)  (.016)  (.016)
LAW & ORDER  .028**  -.007  .020**  .007
(.010)  (.014)  (.009)  (.011)
GROWTH  2.849***  3.569***  3.205***  3.266***  3.159***  2.936***
(.602)  (.578)  (.408)  (.396)  (.425)  (.423)
GOV. SUBS.  .000  -.014  -.008  -.013*  .014't*
/GDP  (.007)  (.008)  (.006)  (.007)  (.006)
NFATA  .184  .467***  .403***  .377***  .412**
(.164)  (.130)  (.138)  (.126)  (.130)
PROFIT  -1.226*  -.858***  -1.012***  -I.1 12***  -.907***









LTD/TA  .517**  .209*  .257***  .410**
(.229)  (.110)  (.094)  (.132)
LTD/TA  x GOV.  -.043**
SUBS. /GDP  (.023)
adj. R2 .46  .61  .69  .70  .72  .68
No of Obs.  26  25  26  26  26  26
and  *  indicate  statistical  significance  at 1, 5 and 10 percents,  respectively.
45Table VII
Sensitivity  Tests Allowing Different  Marginal  Profit  Rates
The regression equation estimated is: Excess Growthlc-.,-ii  = a + I31  MCAP/GDP; + 12  TOR, + I3  INFLATIONi + 14
BANK/GDP, +  I5  LAW & ORDER, +  16 GROWTH 1 +  13  GOV. SUBS./GDPi + 13,  NFATA, +  P,  PROFITj +  Fi.
Dependent variable is the proportion of firms that grow faster than their predicted growth rate. These are firms in a
country whose mean growth in sales exceed their mean maximum short term financed growth rates (MSFG). For each
firm MSFG is defined as ROLTC/(I-zxROLTC) where ROLTC is the ratio of eamings, after tax and interest, to long
term capital and z is a parameter that measures the ratio of the profit rate on the new sales to the firm's  average profits
rate. Estimation results assuming different values of z are given below.  MCAP/GDP is the stock market capitalization
of the country divided by its GDP.  TOR is stock market tumover defined as the total value of shares traded divided by
market capitalization.  INFLATION is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator.  BANK/GDP is the total assets of the
deposit money banks divided by GDP.  LAW & ORDER, scored I to 6,  is an indicator of the degree to which the
citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  GROWTH
is the growth  rate of the real GDP per capita. GOV.  SUBS./GDP are the grants on current account by the  public
authorities to (i) private industries and public corporations and (ii) government enterprises, divided by GDP. NFATA
is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. PROFIT is the income before interest and taxes divided by total assets.
All variables are averaged over the 1980-1991 period.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given
in parantheses.
z=l  z=.75  z=.5  z=0
INTERCEPT  .114  .120  .138  .146
(.126)  (.126)  (.129)  (.132)
MCAP/GDP  -.034  -.033  -.038  -.040
(.033)  (.033)  (.034)  (.034)
TOR  .179*6*  .180***  .172***  .165***
(.032)  (.031)  (.032)  (.029)
INFLATION  -.048  -.046  -.041  -.037
(.045)  (.045)  (.045)  (.045)
BANK/GDP  .012  .011  .011  .009
(.014)  (.013)  (.014)  (.013)
LAW & ORDER  .020**  .019**  .019**  .019**
(.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)
GROWTH  3.205***  3.255***  3.365***  3.591***
(.408)  (.383)  (.371)  (.380)
GOV. SUBS./GDP  -.008  -.008*  -.008*  -.009
(.006)  (.005)  (.005)  (.006)
NFATA  .467*e*  .458***  .433**  .429***
(.130)  (.129)  (.135)  (.139)
PROFIT  -.858***  -.819***  -.791**  -.681**
(.297)  (.292)  (.296)  (.299)
adj. R2  .69  .69  .68  .68
No of Obs.  26  26  26  26
*6*,  *6 and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percents, respectively.
46Table  VIII
Sensitivity Tests -Replacing Sales Growth  with Asset Growth
and  Adjusting  for Inflation
The regression equation estimated is: Excess Growth 1cO,,,, 1 = a  + 01 MCAP/GDPj +  02  TOR, +  03 INFLATION 1 +
13  BANKIGDPi + 13  LAW & ORDERi +  16 GROWTHi +  07  GOV. SUBS./GDP 1 + 18  NFATA, + j9 PROFITi + Ej.
Dependent  variable of specification reported in column (I)  is the proportion of  firms that  grow faster than their
predicted growth rate. These are firms in a country whose mean growth in sales exceed their mean maximum short
term financed growth rates (MSFG). For each firm MSFG is defined as ROLTC/(I-ROLTC)  where ROLTC is the
ratio of earnings, after tax and interest, to long term capital.  In the specification reported in column (2) mean growth
in sales is replaced by mean growth in assets.  In column (3) the specification in column (1) is reestimated using an
adjustment for the effect of inflation on firms' assets and earnings.  The value of the firms' total assets (TA) required
to support sales at time t+1 in time t dollars is given by  (TA(t+l)/I+nr) + (n/l+7t) x(TA(t) - DEP (t+l)) where it is the
rate of inflation between time t and t+l  and DEP(t) is the depreciation of the firm's  long-term assets between t and
t+ 1.  MCAP/GDP is the stock market capitalization of the country divided by its GDP.  TOR is stock market turnover
defined as the total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization.  INFLATION is the inflation rate of the.
GDP deflator.  BANK/GDP is the total assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP.  LAW & ORDER, scored
I to 6,  is an indicator of the degree to which the citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to
mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  GROWTH is the growth rate of the real GDP per capita. GOV. SUBS./GDP
are the grants on current account by the public authorities to (i) private industries and public corporations and (ii)
government enterprises, divided by  GDP. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. PROFIT  is the
income before  interest and taxes  divided by total assets.  All variables are averaged  over the  1980-1991 period.
White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in parantheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)
INTERCEPT  .114  .257  -.348
(.126)  (.231)  (.242)
MCAP/GDP  -.034  -.074  -.027
(.033)  (.073)  (.077)
TOR  .179***  .160**  .129**
(.032)  (.061)  (.055)
INFLATION  -.048  .007  .091
(.045)  (.005)  (.080)
BANKI/GDP  .012  -.025  .045**
(.014)  (.026)  (.017)
LAW & ORDER  .020**  .037***  .043***
(.009)  (.013)  (.014)
GROWTH  3.205**6  4.116***  3.495**
(.408)  (.792)  (1.659)
GOV. SUBS./GDP  -.008  .019***  -.007
(.006)  (.005)  (.011)
NFATA  .467***  .139  .477**e
(.130)  (.176)  (.171)
PROFIT  -.858***  -1.034*6*  2.645***
(.297)  (.376)  (.759)
adj. R2 .69  .44  .43
No of Obs.  26  26  26
*6*,  6*  and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percents, respectively.
47Appendix
Number  of Firms and the Sample Period
No.of Firms  Time Period
Australia  401  1983-91
Austria  44  1983-91
Belgium  89  1983-91
Brazil*  100  1985-91
Canada  494  1983-91
Switzerland  150  1983-91
Germany  359  1983-91
Spain  116  1983-91
Finland  55  1983-91
France  544  1983-91
United Kingdom  1275  1983-91
Hong Kong  173  1983-91
India*  100  1980-90
Italy  81  1983-91
Jordan*  38  1980-90
Japan  1104  1983-91
Korea*  100  1980-90
Mexico*  100  1984-91
Malaysia  143  1983-91
Netherlands  165  1983-91
Norway  52  1983-91
New Zealand  41  1983-91
Pakistan*  100  1980-88
Singapore  213  1983-91
Sweden  68  1983-91
Thailand  137  1983-91
Turkey*  45  1982-90
United States  3247  1983-91
South Africa  67  1983-91
Zimbabwe*  48  1980-88
For those countries with *, the data source for the firm level variables is IFC's corporate finance data base. Otherwise, the data
are from Global Vantage data base.
48Variable Definitions and Sources
Firm-level data:
Global Vantage definitions:
Variables are from the industry/commercial tape of the Global Vantage data base, frozen as of
December 1995.
investment= total assets - total assetst- +depreciation
=DA89-DA89t_,+DAI  I
PERRE=(earnings after taxes-dividends+depreciation)/investment
((DA21 -DA23)-DA34+DA  11)/investment
PERLTD=( (DA 18-Da 1  04)-(DA 118-DA  1  04),  )/investment
PERSTD=((DA 1  04-DA 1  04t i)/investment
PEREQ=(investment-(DA2  1 -DA23-DA34+DA I l)-((DA 118-DA  I 04)-(DA 118-DA  104), l)-(DA 104-
DA 1  04, 1))/investment
PERINV=(nfa-nfa,- +depreciation)/investment=(DA76-DA76t  +DA  11)/investment
PERCA=(ca-cat- )/investment =(DA75-DA75, I)/investment
PERRES=((ta-nfa-ca)-(ta-nfa-ca)t 1 )/investment=((  DA89-DA76-DA75)-(DA89-DA76-DA75)t
,/investment
Itd/ta=(total liabilitities-current liabilities)/total assets=(DA118-DA  1  04)/DA89
nfata=net fixed assets/total assets=DA76/DA89
profit=(EBIT+interest expense)/total assets=(DA2  1  +DA 1  5)/DA89
divta=total dividends/total assets=DA34/DA89
nsnfa=total sales/net fixed assets=DA I /DA76
For the countries for which data is taken from the IFC's corporate finance data base, variables were
created according to the definitions give above.
Other data sources:
Inflation is the annual inflation of the GDP deflator and is obtained from World Bank National
Accounts.
Real GDP per capita and its growth rate are obtained from World Bank National Reports.
bank/gdp is the ratio of deposit money banks domestic assets to GDP, obtained from the IMF,
International Financial Statistics, various years. Deposit money domestic assets are the summation
of IFS lines 22a through 22f.
The Law and Order indicator is obtained from ICRG, International Country Risk Guide.
Government subsidies to private and public enterprises data are obtained from various issues of the
World Competitiveness Report, The World Economic Forum & IMD International, Geneva,
Switzerland.
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